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Abstract
This paper offers a productivity growth estimate for electric energy commercial-
ization ﬁrms in Colombia, using a non-parametric Malmquist bootstrap methodol-
ogy. The estimation and methodology serve two main purposes. First, in Colombia
commercialization ﬁrms are subject to a price-cap regulation scheme, a non-common
arrangement in the international experience for this part of the industry. Therefore
the paper’s result suggest an estimate of the productivity factor to be used by the
regulator, not only in Colombia but in other countries where commercialization is
a growing part of the industry (renewable energy, for instance). Second, because
of poor data collection from regulators and ﬁrms themselves, regulation based on a
single estimation of productivity seems inappropriate and error-prone. The non-
parametric Malmquist bootstrap estimation allows an assessment of the result in
contrast to a single one estimation. This would open an opportunity for the regu-
lator to adopt a narrower and more accurate productivity estimation or override an
implausible result and impose a productivity factor in the price-cap to foster the de-
velopment of the industry.
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1 Introduction
Colombia’s 1994 electric energy regulatory reform split a vertically integrated and state
owned electricity industry into four activities: generation, transmission, distribution and
commercialization. While nation wide transmission and local distribution function as
natural monopolies, generation and commercialization are meant to engage into com-
petitive behavior in order to increase welfare and quality of service to intermediate and
ﬁnal users. This paper offers a productivity growth estimate for electric energy commer-
cialization (or retailing) ﬁrms in Colombia, using a non-parametric Malmquist bootstrap
methodology.
The estimation and methodology serve two purposes. First, Colombia’s commercial-
ization ﬁrms are subject to a price-cap regulation scheme. Therefore the paper’s result
offers an estimate of the productivity offset or the X-factor to be used by the regulator.
The productivity estimate as well as the discussion of energy commercialization objec-
tives, inputs and outputs, can be used for further estimations in other countries or other
industries.
Second, part of the success of price-cap regulation lies on an appropriately estimated
productivitycomponent. Theestimation should capturethe long termtrendof theindus-
try, must be resilient to the estimation method and to exogenous shocks. Besides, when
information is poor (in length of time, number of units under evaluation or quality of
data) such estimation can be inaccurate and error-prone. The non-parametric Malmquist
bootstrap methodology allows an assessment of the productivity estimate in contrast to
a single estimation via non-parametric Malmquist or other non-parametric or parametric
method. This assessment opens an opportunity for the regulator to adopt a narrower
and more precise productivity estimation or override an implausible result and use the
productivity factor as a tool to foster the development of the industry in its early stages.
Non-parametricMalmquistproductivityindices(orDataEnvelopmentAnalysis(DEA)
- Malmquist) have been used to evaluate productivity growth in different industries or
policy change settings.1 As reported in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) it has also been used in
single and cross-country studies for the assessment of performance and productivity in
transmission and distribution. Jamasb and Pollitt also report the use of DEA in translat-
ing efﬁciency and productivity estimation into the price-setting process by the regulator.
Several countries do so, however two warnings are in order. First, in a fully liberalized
power sector, distribution and retailing are separated, however this is not the usual prac-
1There are plenty of studies gathered in Emrouznejad et al. (2008) compilation of efﬁciency and produc-
tivity studies using DEA.
1tice and in most cases both activities function under the same umbrella. Therefore the
productivity offset is the same for both activities. And second, “Frontier approaches are
susceptible to shocks and errors in data. This is specially the case when cross-sectional
data is used and there is no allowance for errors (...) [and] [f]irm speciﬁc efﬁciency
scores are sensitive to the speciﬁcation and assignment of the outputs, inputs and envi-
ronmental variables” Jamasb and Pollitt (P. 28, 2001).
Both warnings are addressed in this paper. First, the productivity estimation is re-
stricted to data available for energy commercialization ﬁrms in Colombia. Second, via
bootstrapping the Malmquist estimation, an assessment of the productivity estimate is
possible on statistical grounds.
Bootstrapping Malmquist indices was proposed more than a decade ago by Simar
and Wilson (1999, 2000a). However, few empirical studies are available, and those are in
disperse research ﬁelds, i.e., Hoff (2006); Balcombe et al. (2008); Latruffe et al. (2008) and
Odeck (2009) in agricultural economics; Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) and Murillo-Melchor
et al. (2010) in banking; and Assaf (2011) in airport services. However, neither there are
studies touching the electricity industry, nor energy commercialization services. In all,
the contribution of the paper is to scrutinize the energy commercialization service using
a suitable case study and a methodological approach unfairly not used more often.2.
Firm speciﬁc productivity growth results suggest high volatility and no clear trend
on productivity growth from 2006 to 2009. In most of the cases, the estimated conﬁdence
intervals for Malmquist productivity, efﬁciency and technical change suggest that indices
growth are not different from unity. These results suggest no statistically differentiable
progress in performance in energy commercialization throughout the last ﬁve year. From
a regulatory point of view, the results suggest the need to select a productivity offset
factor in view of the development of the industry and not strictly to simulate market
competition conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy outlines the functioning of retail or
commercialization ﬁrms. Section 3 discusses bootstrapping DEA and Malmquist indices.
Section 4 presents the energy commercialization service in Colombia. Section 5 presents
the data and estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The commercialization of electric energy in a DEA and Malmquist productivity
analysis
The commercialization of electric energy (also called energy –and related services– re-
tailing or customer sales) links generation, transmission and distribution of power with
ﬁnal customers. This is the entity that power consumers take as the “electric company”
2Colombia’s electricity industry has been well documented in previous studies, see: Pombo (2001); Gar-
cia and Arbelaez (2002); Larsen et al. (2004), and Pombo and Taborda (2006)
2forgetting the supply chain behind it (Philipson and Willis, 1999). In a fully de-regulated
electric industry Philipson and Willis (1999) presents energy retailing as “(...) the most
powerful player in the industry (...) for two reasons.” First it controls the money ﬂow
from customers to the rest of the supply chain, and second it is involved in all levels of
the industry.
In a fully (less) liberalized and developed power industry, commercialization is usu-
ally split (joined) from (with) distribution. When a pool market exists, commercialization
ﬁrms are strongly active and visible; working with large customers willing to engage in
buying electricity at better prices and setting long term contracts with generators. For
small customers (for example: residential users) commercialization ﬁrms are not as vis-
ible and blend with the distribution service. In all, electric energy commercialization
provides an homogeneous good at a given price, where the only differentiation among
retailers is the supply of alternative / complementary energy services. Therefore those
services, mainly focused on customer satisfaction, are the source of higher income and
proﬁt maximization.
Under several possible settings and institutional arrangements, some of the tasks
(among many others) undertaken by a commercialization ﬁrm are:
 Be an agent in the pool market.
 Follow up connection (and disconnection) of customers to the distribution grid.
 Account of customers consumption. Including reading, metering and billing.
 Managing unpaid bills (Debtors).
 Ensure quality of service to customers.
 Supply of backup power or uninterrupted service.
 Supply automation, control and efﬁciency consumption options to customers.
 Product distinction and energy use plans.
 Selling other form s of energy (gas, propane, etc.).
The development of electric energy commercialization highly depends on existing
regulation on ease of entry and use of technologies that can assure ﬁnal users that chang-
ing provider neither represent an extra cost for the commercialization and distribution
industry nor for the ﬁnal customer. Commercialization ﬁrms then, provide an interme-
diation service and function as any other proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. Its functioning and
characterization for the DEA and Malmquist productivity estimation can be summarized
in the use of the following inputs and outputs:
Inputs: Assets; employment; costs.
Outputs: Queries, complaints and appeals (QCA); debtors; customers; electricity con-
sumption.
The proposed list of inputs proxies some of the variables that can be taken as inputs in
the functioning of an energy commercialization ﬁrm. Assets are proposed as a proxy of
3capital, employment of labor, and costs as a decision variable susceptible of being used
to increase efﬁciency and therefore productivity. Within the domain of outputs, QCA
proxies the quality of service, the lower the number of QCA the higher ﬁrm’s efﬁciency.
Management and size of debtors shows the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm; lower debts to the
company show better management practices. The number of customers and electricity
consumption both capture the purpose to increase output.
3 Bootstrapping DEA and Malmquist indices
Based on the concepts developed in Simar and Wilson (1998) and Simar and Wilson
(2000a) to bootstrap nonparametric efﬁciency scores, Simar and Wilson (1999) introduced
a bootstrapping algorithm for Malmquist indices (see also Simar and Wilson, 2000b).
Their presentation is clear and thoroughly, following their notation this section restricts
to present basic concepts and the logic of the bootstrapping in search for an appropriate
characterization of the Data Generating Process (DGP) P behind nonparametric efﬁciency
estimation.
3.1 The Farrell theoretical world
Abstracting from the estimation method (DEA or Free Disposal Hull (FDH)) the input-
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where x is a column vector of p inputs, y is a column vector of q inputs of different
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the Farrell efﬁciency frontier is the subset of X(y) denoted by @X(y):
@X(y) = fxjx 2 X(y); x = 2 X(y) 8 0 <  < 1g (3)
the Farrell input measure of efﬁciency for a combinations of input and output (x;y) 2 	
is deﬁned as a measure of the distance from (x;y) to the efﬁcient frontier @X(y):
(x;y) = inf fj 2 X(y)g (4)












4function  is the radial measure of efﬁciency giving the maximum feasible, proportionate
reduction of inputs for a ﬁrm to operate at (x;y) 2 	. The intersection between @X(y)





in practice 	, X(y), @X(y) and (x;y) are unknown and DEA provides an estimate.
3.2 The DEA world
From a sample of input-output combinations, X = f(xi;yi); i = 1;:::;ng, equations 1

















i = 1;:::;ng (7)
























Figure 1. Basic DEA setup.
Note: a to g are different DMUs, ^ xδ
g(y), ^ (xg;y), and @ ^ X(y) are deﬁned
in section 3.2.
Source: Author’s diagram
3.3 The DEA-bootstrap world
From a new sample of input-output combinations X ⋆ = f(x⋆
i;yi); i = 1;:::;ng, drawn



















i = 1;:::;ng (9)





From ^ P, B samples X ⋆
b can be obtained via Monte Carlo Methods generating B pse-
duo efﬁciency estimates ⋆
b(x;y). Two key elements of the bootstrap are: the generation
6of the pseudo sample (x⋆
i;yi) and how to obtain X ⋆
b .
First, to generate x⋆
i select randomly with replacement ⋆
n from ^ i (equation 7) where:
⋆
1;:::;⋆
n  i.i.d ^ F (11)
replace 8 in 10
^ (x;y)
^ ⋆(x;y)
^ x∂ = ^ x⋆∂(y) = x⋆
i (12)
in this way x⋆
i is formed by taking a random deviation from the input vector right on the
frontier.
Simar and Wilson (1998) and Simar and Wilson (2000a) show how ^ F in 11 has a posi-
tive mass at  = 1 therefore in the sampling of efﬁciency scores to generate x⋆
i would be
biased. The problem is summarized as the fact that in cases of high number of efﬁcient
units, ^ F would be a poor estimate of the true distribution of  being too close to the upper
efﬁciency bound 1. The solution is a smoothed bootstrap from a kernel density estimate
of ^ F.
When the bootstrap is founded in the random selection of (in)efﬁciency measure-
ments and its use in the generation of a new pseudo sample x⋆
i this is analogous to the
bootstrap on residuals in regression analysis. Note that efﬁciency measures are relative
to an estimate of the frontier, therefore there is uncertainty because the sampling varia-
tion, and the DGP can be reduced to understand the variation in efﬁciency. In Simar and
Wilson words “Basing the bootstrap on the [^ ] will account for the fact that hte observed
inefﬁciencies are conditional on the observed outputs as well as the observed frontier
[@ ^ X(y)].”(Simar and Wilson, 1998, p. 54)
3.4 The Malmquist-bootstrap world
Efﬁciency based Malmquist indices were proposed by F¨ are et al. (1992). The estimation
implies having at least two time periods of input-output data and requires four different







































Mi(t1;t2) can be interpreted as an index of total factor productivity under the as-
sumption of constant returns to scale (Caves et al., 1982). The index would show growth
(reduction)inproductivityfromtimet1 tot2 when(intheinput-orientedcase)less(more)
7than 1. The change in technical efﬁciency is equal to the ﬁrst ratio of 14, and the remain-
der raised to the square root is the growth in technical change.
Since the estimation of 13 is the same as in 7 the use of DEA and the bootstrapping
applies in the same way as discussed above. Firms deviate from the true frontier and
the distance function suggests this random deviation as inefﬁciency. This is the DGP that
supports the bootstrap and sensitivity analysis.
4 Colombia’s energy commercialization services
The structure of Colombia’s energy retail is similar to the discussed in section 2 with
an highly but not completely liberalized energy industry. From the rigid and mono-
lithic structure the industry moved into a fully disintegrated industry into generation,
transmission, distribution and commercialization services. Besides the progress on the
macro-arrangement of the industry, progress in the commercialization service is far from
the picture presented in Philipson and Willis (1999, chapter 12).
In many cases, commercialization ﬁrms never split completely from the distribution
business and the apparently joint structure does not let to distinguish who provides what
service. A second failure of the liberalization is the poor deepening of business. There are
no energy related services provided by these ﬁrms as some of the ones listed in section
2. Services such as quality of service, backup power, supply automation, efﬁciency con-
sumption, product differentiation via consumption plans, power from alternative energy
sources (e.g.: solar or wind).
In summary, although the liberalization of electricity services did provide beneﬁts, in
particular regarding generation backup alternatives (non hydrological sources of power
generation during draught times), deepening of each new section of the industry has
not been encouraging. Services are provided in very much the same way as done in
pre-liberalization times.
The regulatory structure of energy and gas services at all levels is on the hands of
Comisi´ on de Regulaci´ on de Energ´ ıa y Gas (CREG). CREG deals mainly with tariff struc-
ture and long term sustainability of power supply. However, CREG has no penalizing
means upon ﬁrms that do not comply with quality and end-users complaints. Instead,
Superintendencia de Servicios P´ ublicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) is the government agency
whose responsibility is to track the operation of all public utilities (water, gas, power,
garbage collection). SSPD does have the ability to penalize utilities, however the perfor-
mance on this regards is still poor.
85 Data and empirical results
Data on commercialization services of power in colombia is obtained from Sistema ´ Unico
de Informaci´ on (SUI), SSPD’s utilities information database. The variables extracted from
this database provide information on ﬁnancial and quality of service performance. Vari-
able extraction was done in line with the functions pursued by a power retail ﬁrm as
in section 2. The estimation was performed using 18 commercialization ﬁrms for which
information from 2005 to 2009 was available and complete. The bootstrap was done with
3,000 repetitions using the FEAR package (Wilson, 2008, 2010) in R (R Development Core
Team, 2011) and further manipulations in STATA (StataCorp, 2009).
The bootstrapping Malmquist indices (and the underlying DEA) was done with the
following input-output variables.
Inputs: Assets; employment; costs.
Outputs: Queries, complaints and appeals; arrears, customers; electricity consumption.
Variables are deﬁned as:
Assets: Long term assets, taken from accounting practices refers to value of assets the
ﬁrmdeclaredthecorrespondingyear. (MillionofColombianpesos, yearbase2005).
Employment: Number of employees hired by the ﬁrm.
Costs: Annual operational costs. (Million of Colombian pesos, year base 2005).
Queries, complaints and appeals: Number of recorded queries or complaints ﬁlled by
customers.
Arrears: Customers’ unpaid bills.
Customers: Number of customers served.
Electricity consumption: Electricity consumption in kwh.
Results for the Malmquist productivity, technical efﬁciency and technical change are
presented in ﬁgures 2, 3 and 4, with 95% conﬁdence intervals for the 18 retail ﬁrms
studied. All indexes are expressed as the reciprocal of the respective (input - oriented)
estimated index. Given the construction of the Malmquist index, to infer productivity
growth, the index should be compared against a value of 1, for instance a value of 1.05
implies a 5% productivity growth. Efﬁciency and productivity improvements appear
when the indices are bigger than unity and reduction if less than unity.
A ﬁrst ﬁnding for the Malmquist productivity index (ﬁgure 2) is volatility through
time. No ﬁrm shows a steady productivity growth, and two (ﬁrm 157 and 194) show
a decreasing productivity trend. When conﬁdence intervals include a value of one, no
productivity change can be attributed to the ﬁrm. This result is observed 10 out of 72
(4 years  18 ﬁrms) productivity measures. 35 out of 72 measures of productivity sug-
gest a signiﬁcant increase in productivity, and 27 out of 72 a signiﬁcant reductions of
productivity.
Looking at the decomposition of the Malmquist index into efﬁciency and techni-
9cal change, four ﬁrms (labeled 174, 180, 190 and 194) show absolute no change in efﬁ-
ciency, leaving all productivity effect to technical change. Conﬁdence intervals are a lot
wider here than in the Malmquist estimates. In 8 out of 18 retail ﬁrms, although non-
bootstrapped estimation suggest efﬁciency change (growth or reduction), conﬁdence in-
tervals are wide enough to include unity, making any statement about efﬁciency unreli-
able for all period of study. There are only a few cases of efﬁciency change that can be
assessed as signiﬁcantly different from one.
Conﬁdence interval for technology changes include unity in 15 out of 18 ﬁrms (for
all the time period studied), although the point Malmquist estimates suggests growth
or reduction. This result is in line with the ﬁnding of high non-signiﬁcant change in
efﬁciency.
Concluding, the resultson productivity, efﬁciencyand technical change ﬁgures, along
with the conﬁdence intervals, suggest that the volatility and uncertainty should refrain
the regulator to use a single DEA - Malmquist estimation for regulatory purposes upon
single ﬁrms. Once a single estimation of productivity is used in a price-cap formula or
remuneration formula for single production units, the chances of obtaining a different
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Figure 2. Malmquist productivity and 95% conﬁdence intervals.


















































































































2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
153 154 155 157
158 160 161 164
165 167 168 172





























































































































































2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
153 154 155 157
158 160 161 164
165 167 168 172
174 180 187 190
192 194
Technology change index CI
Year
Figure 4. Technical change and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Note: Technical change.
Source: Author’s calculation.
135.1 Industry wide results
An option for the regulator is to estimate the average productivity, efﬁciency or techno-
logical change results up to the industry level and use this result in the price-cap formula.
Table 1 shows the mean and median of Malmquist, efﬁciency and technical change from
a single Malmquist estimation and the 3,000 bootstrapped 3000. Figure 5 in a box plot
shows basic distributional characteristics of the results.
Table 1 use the average and median to summarize the point estimates of productivity,
efﬁciency and technical change and the bootstrapped estimation. The box plot summa-
rizes the distributional characteristics of the productivity results. The box is bounded by
the 75% and 25% percentiles, the 50% percentile is the horizontal line inside the box and
whiskers the minimum and maximum.
All the aggregate estimations suggest growth in the Malmquist productivity index,
ranging from 2.48% in 2006 to 10% in 2007 for the point estimation results (2.58% to
11.38% in the bootstrapped estimation). Average efﬁciency growth is high for the boot-
strapped estimation (31%) offset by the technology reduction of 14%.
14Table 1. Malmquist, efﬁciency and technical change (mean and me-
dian)
Point Malmquist estimation
Year Malmquist Efﬁciency Technology Malmquist Efﬁciency Technology
Mean Median
2006 1.0248 0.9364 1.1108 0.9962 1 1.0402
2007 1.1086 1.0122 1.1246 1.1194 1 1.2136
2008 1.0572 1.1087 0.9647 1.0366 1.0982 0.9647
2009 1.0371 1.1774 0.9287 1.0492 1 0.9909
Bootstrapped Malmquist estimation
Year Malmquist Efﬁciency Technology Malmquist Efﬁciency Technology
Mean Median
2006 1.0258 1.0056 1.0466 1.0001 1.0046 1.0051
2007 1.1138 0.9498 1.2168 1.1301 0.9084 1.2351
2008 1.0605 1.1443 0.9526 0.9998 1.155 0.9385
2009 1.0329 1.3165 0.8606 1.0325 1.1501 0.8625
Note: Industry’s Malmquist, efﬁciency and technical change (mean and median)
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Figure 5. Single and Bootstrapped Malmquist productivity, efﬁciency
and technological change.





for commercialization or retail services in Colombia’s electric energy industry from 2005
to 2009. The estimation has been performed bootstrapping the underlying DEA estima-
tion following Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000a). The beneﬁt of this approach is to
be able to assess the signiﬁcance of the estimated indices upon the statistical properties
of the bootstrap methodology. In particular, to see if the indices are signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from unity, in other words if the a point estimation showing productivity growth or
reduction can be regarded as non-signiﬁcant.
The empirical results conﬁrm that ﬁrm speciﬁc Malmquist productivity indices are
not signiﬁcant in 10 out of 72 estimations. Efﬁciency and technical change show a lower
performance, most of the estimations bounded by the 95% conﬁdence intervals include
unity. Therefore any assessment of catch-up effect or technology growth can be disre-
garded. Albeit the disparate results at ﬁrm level, the aggregate productivity ﬁgures wan-
der around values of 1 with great variance and high probability of being statistically not
different from unity.
From the empirical analysis of Colombia’s retail ﬁrms, two main messages can be
drawn. First, productivity ﬁgures from the DEA-Malmquist methodology are down-
graded by the ﬁrms under scrutiny when results are not favorable, claiming its deter-
ministic approach and the inability to be tested on statistical grounds. Under such crit-
icism bootstrapping surges as a plausible alternative. As in this case study, results are
not only framed into a statistics framework but can show no productivity, efﬁciency or
technological change at all.
On the other hand, when regulators require a productivity measure for the offset fac-
tor the message is to be ready to ﬁnd nil productivity changes and to use his discretionary
power to determine an “X” factor in order to promote growth and deeper competitive-
like environment to increase welfare and proﬁt in the industry.
17Appendices
18Acronyms
CREG Comisi´ on de Regulaci´ on de Energ´ ıa y Gas (Colombia’s power and
gas utilities regulator.)
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis
DGP Data Generating Process
DMU Decision Making Unit
FDH Free Disposal Hull
QCA Queries, complaints and appeals
SSPD Superintendencia de Servicios P´ ublicos Domiciliarios (Colombia’s
governmental utilities quality and service body)
SUI Sistema ´ Unico de Informaci´ on (SSPD’s utilities information
system)
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